The title of this contribution is a paraphrase of the "Third Humanism" which was a philosophical educational programme propagated in the last century, especially by the German-American scholar Werner Jaeger. It implied an orientation towards ancient Greek educational ideals. It has justly been heavily criticised. Yet, in reflecting about the significance of present-day humanities, the past influence of ancient (Greek) thought should be kept in mind, albeit with a critical disposition. In view of the current epochal changes, namely in the global distribution of economic and political power, in the global cultural climate, and in many educational systems, reflections about a novel "Fourth Humanism" might give valuable conceptual guidelines.
Introduction
By definition the humanities are in the plural. They encompass the multiple "branches of knowledge that concern themselves with human beings and their culture".
2 My title suggests that in some sense there is also a multiplicity of humanism itself. But the following should not be a philological exercise about definitions of humanities and humanism, although occasionally we have to come to the issue of their interrelation. I rather propose some reflections on the role of conceptions of humanism for higher education on the basis of some historical considerations. Hopefully this will lead to some new thoughts about the role of humanism in curricula involving the humanities. In my proposed way of counting, this would lead us to a fourth epoch of Humanism -but we have also to cope briefly with the opinion that humanism as a concept is obsolete in a future 'post-human' or 'hyperhistorical' world.
For Werner Jaeger (1947, p. 277) , the influential classicist, 3 "humanism means education which is deliberately modelled on a certain ideal conception of human nature." If we follow this thought, we may observe: (i) humanism is an educational concept, and, I would like to add, it is in particular a concept with a bearing on Higher Education, and (ii) humanism depends on human ideals which are prone to change over time and space.
All over the globe there is today a high esteem for Higher Education. But it is worth noting that in some respects this particular globalisation is not that novel as we might think. The ancient origins of the idea that mankind may be bettered by education were global at their very beginnings, when humans first contemplated self-critically their humanity. In this context we may consider the influential German-Swiss philosopher Karl Jaspers (1953, pp. 2, 4) , PhDsupervisor and lifelong friend of Hannah Arendt. He observed that mankind over large parts of the globe experienced a simultaneous "step into universality", an "Axial Age", as he named it. This happened around 500 BC in a relatively short time span during which " [t] he whole of humanity took a forward leap". It is remarkable that without knowledge in one region of the world of parallel goings-on in other regions, we had during this time the teachings of Confucius and Lao-tse in China, the Upanishads and Buddha in India, Zarathustra in Iran; in Palestine we had the prophets from Elijah onwards, and in Greek-speaking regions there appeared the teachings of Parmenides, Heraclitus and Plato. All of these names stand for deep reflections about the cosmic condition of humans and humankind. It was in this period that prior human knowledge and traditions coagulated into systems of self-reflecting thought. " [F] undamental categories within which we still think today, and the beginnings of the world religions, by which human beings still live, were created. The step into universality was taken in every sense", as Jaspers (ibid.) points out.
The teachings of today, around 2500 years later, cannot be meaningfully compared to those of the ancient Axial Age. But there is some irony in this development. In education and research we have moved from ancient universality to modern specificity. We now have in many fields of science an extreme compartmentalisation of disciplines. This development defies the ancient universality of human inquisitiveness as it was registered by Karl Jaspers. Also, in contrast with the ancient Axial universality of thoughts in separate regions, the more recent humanism(s) were regionally specific phenomena.
The Higher Education of the present time is the outcome of Western humanistic traditions, their remnants nowadays spreading across the globe. But this spreading happens with a vengeance. Ironically, we have now, in the seeming hour of the triumph of Western ideas, also a global disregard for humanistic roots of education in general, and in particular for those of higher education. 4 In order to substantiate this remark, I limit myself to alluding to Martha Nussbaum's (2010) much acclaimed book Not for Profit.
5 It propagates the plea that "democracy needs the humanities", as its subtitle proclaims, thereby articulating that the humanities are challenged and that we must fight for their acceptance and support.
Although I agree with the acclaim for this book, nevertheless I see problems in some of its formulations. For one, the case seems to be debatable that the humanities are indeed in danger. As a recent article in the New Republic claimed, presently there is an enormous number of students who do graduate with humanities degrees (Greteman 2014) . In the United States it is allegedly only business degrees which surpass their number. Thus, "the humanities" seem to be flourishing.
One may argue, however, that numbers of graduates are not really the appropriate object of concern. The problem seems to be not one of numbers but one of objectives. Or, adapting the jargon of the "taxonomy of educational objectives", 6 we may say in the present context: the problem is not a cognitive one, but an affective one. It is not whether enough students know enough of subjects which may be subsumed under the heading "humanities". The problem is rather whether higher education is able to transmit 'humanitarian' attitudes to the students' own life and to that of others. Even if there were "enough" 4 For an elaboration of this latter aspect see Readings (1966, p. 19 ): "we need to recognize the University as a ruined institution, one that has lost its historical raison d'être" (his emphases). 5 Grant H. Cornwell, President of the College of Wooster, on the back cover of the book: "Martha Nussbaum is the most erudite and visionary scholar writing on higher education today... ". 6 See, e.g., Clark (1999) . students of humanities, that does not mean that we would have "enough" humanism in their heads and hearts when they graduate.
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Behind books like Nussbaum's just mentioned, there seems to be the concern that much of the teaching of humanities transmits simply specific knowledge and competence, but not a humanistic attitude towards self and society. So, the important catchword in that context is not simply "The Humanities" but "Humanistic Humanities". I see a further problem in Nussbaum's programmatic subtitle in that it postulates a purpose-oriented evaluation of humanities, namely for the single and specific purpose of supporting democracy. But an argument for humanistic humanities should plead for an attitude which is free from purposes other than the curiosity of critical reflection about the human self and about the common human condition.
"First Humanism" as civilising project
There seems to be agreement among scholars that the origin of humanities in the context of a civilising humanistic educational programme might be seen in the Latin reception of the Classical Greek conception of paideia, the Greek term for education and learning. Karl Jaspers (1953, p.59) observes: "Since the times of the Scipios [c.200-50 BC, GMA], Humanism has been a form of the cultural consciousness which, in varying inflections, has run through Western history right up to the present." Thus, in Cicero's treatise De Oratore, I. viii. §33, referring to the year 91 BC, we read about an educational programme with the aim (Sutton 1967, p. 27): to gather scattered humanity into one place, [and/ GMA] or to lead it out of its brutish existence in the wilderness up to our present condition of civilization as men and as citizens, or, after the establishment of social communities, to give shape to laws, tribunals, and civic rights As Cicero's treatise goes, these thoughts are motivated by remembering Socrates in Plato's dialogues and the ancient Greek culture of intellectual discourse.
But the Latin variant of humanism, as this little quote already shows, entails not just a specific intellectual orientation, nor just theoretical reflections about society as we have it in the Classical Greek literature. Rather it propagates a practical shaping of "laws, tribunals, and civic rights". The latter programme generated the specific Latin contribution to mankind, the Roman Law which still exerts its influence on modern legal thought and study. Thus there is this specifically Latin aspect of humanitas -humanism as a phenomenon in a specific legal system, namely that of the Imperium Romanum and its heirs.
Since the ancient Roman time we have also the memory of a paradigmatic figure for Western humanism. It is the ancient Greek philosopher Socrates, who was executed in 399 BC for his "blasphemy" of thinking critically for himself and for instigating his fellow citizens to do likewise. His birth around 479 BC connects the Greek philosophical roots to the Axial Age as seen by Karl Jaspers.
8 Socrates is immortalised especially in Plato's account of his defence speech, the Apology. Maybe the most stunning present-day tribute to his memory is the confession by the late CEO of the hugely successful Apple computer company, Steve Jobs, an erstwhile college dropout: "I would trade all of my technology for an afternoon with Socrates." (Newsweek 2001).
"Second Humanism" as a paradigm of renewal
In spite of Steve Jobs' confession that a conversation with Socrates is more desirable for him than "all" of Apple's computer technology, the concept of Humanism as educational aim might appear to be rather antiquated. We should note, however, that the Director General of UNESCO, Irina Bokova (2010, p. 2) recently proclaimed: "UNESCO is guided by an essential humanism." Early in its history its secretariat invoked "the classical humanities of East and West". Humanities may be "regarded as genuine cultural resources in the present situation, provided they can be renewed" (UNESCO 1955, p. 8) . Many scholars can subscribe to the sentiment that "the classic example of a renewal of humanistic culture is the so-called Renaissance" (ibid. counter-model of Second Humanism is the supposedly barbarian gothic scholasticism (Heidegger 1976, p. 320) . Indeed, for the schoolmen of the Middle Ages the Latin term humanitas did not stand for the blessings of civilisation, as it did for the ancient Romans, but rather for human humbleness before their God's overwhelming divinitas (Birus 1994, p. 16 ).
"Third Humanism" and the industrial age
According to Marxist doctrine it is the specific modes of production which shape social relations and the human consciousness of a specific age. The Marxism of the 19th and 20th centuries is a substantiation of that doctrine in that it considers itself as having supplied the philosophical basis and the consciousness appropriate for the industrial age. Karl Marx himself witnessed the rapid development of capitalist production with awe and, as we all know, he falsely foresaw its equally rapid decline due to its own inner contradictions.
We should remember in this context that Karl Marx was deeply entrenched in the mindset of the humanistic education of his time. He was well trained and competent in ancient Greek and Latin. His university dissertation was on the "Difference between the Democritean and Epicurean Philosophy of Nature" 10 . It is against this background that we may read Marx's (1844) claims concerning humanism as a communistic project. As Haug (1996 Haug ( -2002 remarked, the present-day disappearance of the ancients-oriented humanistic education means that the context is lost in which Karl Marx himself could have expected to be understood. This applies also to kindred spirits like Marx's friend and collaborator Friedrich Engels or Marx's contemporary socialist activist Ferdinand Lassalle whose humanistic erudition is manifested by his treatise on Heraclitus, the philosopher who, in our introductory section, was mentioned as one of Karl Jaspers' outstanding ancient Greek exponents of the Axial Age. (Lassalle 1858) .
Deploring nowadays the general absence of the erudition which once went with 19th century humanistic education is futile and intellectually unproductive. Nostalgia for past educational content could easily discredit the reception of Humanism as being an elitist project in principle with inherently limited appeal, namely only to people who have the means and the education to absorb ancient Greek and Latin thought. We must face the fact that the changed educational climate of the present times makes it virtually impossible to receive to-day the social theories of the past in a way and context in which they were once conceived, say, in the 19th century.
The problem of the present-day disappearance of past perceptions of humanism and humanistic educational ideals applies not just to Marxist social thought. With McCarthy (2009, p. 79) we may note Aristotle's influence on the rise of nineteenth-century European social thought was as profound as it was pervasive.... It is the ideals of Aristotle which gave life to the substance and spirit of modern social theory and provided an entirely different paradigm than that presented by the Enlightenment.
Following McCarthy one can trace the details of the ancient Greek influence in the writings of Max Weber, Emile Durkheim, Sigmund Freud.
In the USA we had, somewhat later, the predominantly literary movement of "American humanism" or "New Humanism", associated in particular with Irving Babbitt of Harvard University. This particular attempt at a new humanism is noteworthy for an Aristotelian philosophical approach in combination with a strong Buddhist orientation.
11 Thus it could be an interesting precedent for attempts at a trans-cultural humanism. But Babbitt's humanism was received and criticised as being predominantly literary and with little relevance for modern social situations.
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It is not only in literary criticism and in social sciences in the narrower sense where we may see a specific variant of an orientation towards ancient Greek philosophy and literature. From his biographer Robert Skidelsky (1983, p. 167) we know that in 1906 the later famous economist John Maynard Keynes wrote to his friend Litton Stratchey: "Have you read the Ethics of that superb Aristotle? ... There never was such good sense talked -before or since." A further case in point is the economist of the Austrian School, Carl Menger. He considered himself as being basically an Aristotelian.
13
Whether we subscribe to Marxist 'Historical Materialism' or not, it seems plausible that the specific social theories of the 19th and 20th centuries are part 11 Hindus (1994, p. 29) Cowley (1930, p. 70 ) "Babbitt seems to contemplate the salvation of society through a private school system culminating in a Humanist university." 13 For a critical assessment of Menger's claims and of endorsements by some of his followers see Crespo (2003) .
of the philosophical and conceptual reaction of the new industrial age. Part of this reaction is a specific reconsideration of humanism, a Third Humanism. But this term has multiple implications, especially if we subsume under it also the reactionary American "New Humanism" just mentioned.
A further viewpoint arises in this context when we consider that there is also a specific form of Third Humanism which, under this very term, is associated with the German philosophers Eduard Spranger and Werner Jaeger and with a larger circle of partially kindred minds. Jaeger emigrated to the United States during the German Nazi era. Jaeger's and Spranger's Third Humanism is a normative one which was meant to require a specific devotion to its high ideals. It tried to imbibe the German youth and the public with the spirit of ancient Spartan rigour and with Platonic probing. Their project failed because it was more a romantic escape from the challenges of its age than a realistic programme for the future. It could not cope with upcoming variants of totalitarianism -and this maybe because of the logic of totalitarianism itself. As Lou Marinoff (2002, p. 42 ) diagnoses: totalitarian regimes of the twentieth century required no Aristotles, Confucii, Senecas, or Bacons to tutor their leaders or influence their fortunes; philosophical consultants were replaced by ideologues, zealots, propagandists, and mass murderers. The German Third Humanists of the inter-war period were ambivalent in their attitude towards the National Socialist movement. Their main propagators vainly hoped to influence it in their sense. Important founding fathers soon retired into privacy (Eduard Spranger) or emigrated (Werner Jaeger). One of their circle, Claus Schenk Count von Stauffenberg eventually turned tyrannicide, but unsuccessfully. His assassination attempt against Hitler failed in July 1944. He might have taken moral support from the ancient Greek reverence for tyrannicide. He and his co-conspirators were executed, among them Dietrich Bonhoeffer, unforgotten as an exemplary modern Christian humanist.
14 Thus a number of kindred minds were liquidated in the last days of World War II.
The German brand of Third Humanism was too scattered in its orientation and in its membership as to exert a lasting influence for a new humanistic renaissance. The means of production of the 21st century are radically different from those of the time of Karl Marx and of the other thinkers of the variants of Third Humanism as mentioned above. So are the material means of communication and of education. The humanism(s) of ancient Rome, of the Renaissance, and of the higher education of the 19th century are now perhaps subjects of nostalgia for some scholars, but the old educational arrangements cannot be revived. The new challenges of technological progress seem to be overbearing.
The ancients allegedly never thought of the issue of technology according to Kevin Kelly (2010, p. 7) : "Technology could be found everywhere in the ancient world except in the minds of humans." 16 Kelly proclaims that we must conceive technology as a being which wants (ibid. p. 270) "increasing efficiency, increasing opportunity...". In that list we have lower down also "freedom" and "beauty" but the term humanism never turns up in that book.
Let it be noted that, contrary to Kelly, ancient philosophy did reflect about what technology could do to humans, but it did so critically, focussing on Daedalus, the paradigmatic ancient inventor. The fable has it that he devised King Minos' labyrinth where generations of young Athenians were sacrificed to the monstrous Minotaur. The death of Daedalus's son Ikarus who used his father's flying device incautiously is a millennia-old warning to mankind about the potential dangers of technology. 17 It is in humorous irony that in the dialogue Euthyphro (passage 11B) Socrates is presented as claiming that Daedalus was his ancestor, part of the joke being that the robots which Daedalus produced had the tendency to walk away. 18 Socrates slyly suggests in this passage that it might be likewise when one debates with him: the thoughts might go originally unintended ways due to Socrates' argumentative inventiveness. 19 It is a gross misrepresentation of the ancient Greek mentality to claim that, although admittedly it did produce highly creative technological inventions, it totally failed to reflect about them. It did so in mathematical and philosophical terms.
It is in a Kelly-like ahumanistic mindset that we must call for an education which is oriented only towards efficiency and excellence in technology and commerce 20 In spite of this seemingly Socratic "I know that I don't know" we cannot look to Greenspan as a figurehead for a humanistic revival in the world of finance and economics.
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Maybe in his state of "shocked disbelief" Greenspan could have noted with sympathy that old Socrates had already warned that there can be reckless fiddling with financial figures. It is doubtful, however, that Greenspan was ever aware that in Plato's dialogue Hippias it is "next to the tables of the bankers" (Cuomo 2001, p. 41 ) that Socrates alerts his dialogue partner Hippias of the potential falsifications of clever mathematicians. Cuomo (p.42) explains that according to Socrates, "the accountant, the person who embodies democratic control over the workings of the polis, is shown to be the potential master of deceit."
There are signs, however, that the ahumanistic 'cult of growth and greed' might be reconsidered, not least in the economic sphere itself. In his keynote speech at the "2nd World Humanities Forum", Korean scholar Yersu Kim (2012, p. 14) diagnosed: "humanities programs for CEOs have sprung up like mushrooms after the rain". 22 20 This is the mentality which Martha Nussbaum (2010, pp. 127-8) eloquently addresses, pointing to government attitudes in Great Britain: "Whole departments may even be closed down, as numerous classics and philosophy programs have been". 21 As Nobel Memorial Laureate Paul Samuelson famously commented, Greenspan "had been an Ayn Rander. You can take the boy out of the cult but you can't take the cult out of the boy. He actually had instruction, probably pinned on the wall: '... Greed is good.'" (Thompson 2009 ). 22 Yersu Kim (2012, p. 14) substantiates: "The CEOs go through weeks of rigorous evenings studying Socrates to Confucius, Machiavelli to Sun Zi, Hermann Hesse to Han Young Man, Marx to Beopjeong. Not only businessmen participate, there are people from the financial world This surprising increase in -university-wise extramural -interest in subjects which traditionally would belong to a humanistic higher education does not necessarily conflict with the tenets of historical materialism. According to Lou Marinoff (2002, p. 141) , behind this development there might be some very conscious working at a new consciousness for a new age: Currently, the vital functional linkage [concerning means of production, GMA] is between human minds and dynamic structures, so the corresponding operational question becomes "How do we best systematize human performance?" These days one hires a philosophical consultant; he tells you how.... That's the general picture. Cramming classical literature in an intellectually pre-digested form to CEOs by a well-paid philosophy coach is a far cry from Socratic discourse, however. The problem with some present post-industrial efficiency-oriented approaches towards humanities is that they are likely to be inefficient in a humanistic sense insofar as, following Kant's imperative, the development of human minds must be a purpose in itself and not a means for others' purposes. The human mind which imbibes the thoughts, say, of Socrates and Confucius with the aim of a better management of company xyz is not free for thought but bound by that company's ends.
It might appear to be exotic if in this context one alludes to the Chinese Taoist maxim of Wu Wei as a principle of mastering one's task by not resorting to conscious purposeful action. We cannot delve here into debates about the essence of oriental thought about human action, not even into debates about the essence of "the" Western humanism, especially since we advocate here to be aware that this is a multifaceted topic. But as an anecdotal illustration of the irony of purposeful education I would like to draw attention to a comment on the outstanding American physicist J. Willard Gibbs (1839 Gibbs ( -1903 . He anticipated several aspects of Albert Einstein's scientific argumentation, and Einstein considered Gibbs to be "the greatest mind in American history." 23 As a student at Yale, Gibbs "won several prizes for excellence in Latin and mathematics. He didn't win any prizes for excellence in science." As Dyson (1990, p. 269) the shift in the schools [in the UK after World War II, GMA] from Latin and Greek to physics and chemistry has been successful in keeping the most original minds away from science. That is why I can sincerely congratulate Yale University for giving Gibbs a thorough training in Latin. The author concludes that what is needed in early education is "not more hours of physics and chemistry but a vision of a future that will be different from the past" (p.276).
An inspired humanistic education could well be the appropriate means for this end, even in a post-industrial age. Such inspiration could come from the thoughts which have moved outstanding members of humankind since the Axial Age. It is still an ongoing concern to become truly human in the sense of Confucius or Cicero, Buddha or Plato, Zarathustra or the Prophets, to name just a few. Becoming conscious of some humanism of the past thus could well inspire present-day students for creative solutions to challenges of the future.
Perspectives for a "Fourth Humanism"
A few years after the end of the Second World War Karl Jaspers (1953, p.214) proclaimed: Today the situation demands: We must return to a deeper origin, to a fountainhead from which all faith once welled forth in its particular historical shapes, to this wellspring which can flow at any time man is ready for it. With Karl Jaspers one could see the "wellspring" of a new humanistic beginning in the project of a return to the teachings of the great minds of the Axial Age, but nowadays in a culturally more encompassing way.
The many past and present manifestations of inhumanity in spite of centuries of well-meaning exhortations can, however, call into question humanism as a programmatic concept. According to Gray (2003, xi) , the humanistic "belief in progress is a superstition". He praises (p. 38) Arthur Schopenhauer as having made a "still unsurpassed critique of humanism". But we should not overlook that even Schopenhauer, the paragon of anti-humanistic critique, did advocate the ancients-oriented "study of humanity". 24 An interesting case of probing into the topicality of humanism after World War II is given by Heidegger (1976) . 25 His essay on humanism was originally written in 1947 while Heidegger was still forbidden from teaching because of his involvement with National Socialism. In spite of this involvement he is considered to be one of the most influential philosophers of the 20th century. Heidegger (p. 321) notes that all humanism is metaphysical, yet, in humanistic discourse, we must get to the Being of the human. For metaphysics the "truth of Being" remains hidden, however (p. 331), as far as the physical aspects of existence are concerned. Thus there is a problematic conceptual discrepancy between metaphysical Humanism on the one hand and the physical human Being on the other.
In the end Heidegger does not reject humanism as an inherently contradictory project but rather he rejects associated high-sprung philosophical aspirations as being unwarranted. In this context Heidegger (pp. 363-4) de-emphasises the "law of logics" (Gesetz des Denkens) in favour of the "law of appropriateness" (Gesetz der Schicklichkeit) which, in his view, implies a triplicity: "the severity of reflection, the diligence of diction, the economy of expression".
Heidegger does not elaborate on details of his triplicity. His terminology suggests, however, that in this particular context his diction is akin to that of some ancient Eastern thought. 26 There is a sizeable literature about this question. 27 Heidegger's just mentioned passage about the "law of appropriateness" might point in particular to a possibly related thought of Confucius's whose "junzi [exemplary person] is concerned with (relational) appropriateness with the same due diligence that the common person is concerned with (personal) benefit" (Thompson 2012, p. 69 ; square brackets added). There is, of course, the open question as to whether concepts of "appropriateness" have the same meaning in different cultural contexts. A clarification surpasses the scope of the present essay. But these remarks might be taken as an indication that in particular a debate about humanism in the postindustrial age might be a fertile topic for trans-cultural exchange.
Samuel Huntington (1998) has written a much-discussed book on The Clash of Civilizations... in which he proclaimed scepticism concerning the concept of a "universal civilization" (p. 56). This scepticism is probably warranted. But from 26 Compare May (1996, p. 53) : "Heidegger, without stating his sources, in a number of cases of central importance appropriated ideas germane to his work from German translations primarily of Daoist classics but presumably of Zen Buddhist texts as well." 27 For a discussion of Heidegger's essay on humanism before a Japanese audience see Stenger (2009) . For further aspects of Heidegger and Asian thought see, e.g., Elberfeld (2003) , Denker, et.al. (2013) , Neto and Santos (2013) . The title of the last-mentioned publication, The inevitable dialogue with the eastern world is an almost literal translation from Heidegger (1953, p.41) : "das unausweichliche Gespräch mit der ostasiatischen Welt." disbelief in "universal civilization" it does not follow that people and peoples of different "civilisations" are particularly prone to "clash" as Huntington's book title suggests. In view of two World Wars which were fought to a large extent on European territory we can say that hitherto the bloodiest clashes in modern history have been between members of very similar civilisations. 28 If it is our aim to avoid comparable clashes in the future, then we must not aspire to a levelling of differences in cultures and civilisations. We must rather work towards conflict resolution on the basis of mutual respect and acceptance of differences.
It is in view of this aspiration that when thinking about the tasks of Higher Education we may also contemplate the conscious acceptance of the "wellsprings" of different conceptions of humanity. This, however, requires an acquisition of consciousness that there are multiple conceptions of humanity with their own specific contexts. These conceptions cannot be fully appreciated without a deeper understanding of their context. Thus there is need for a systematic trans-cultural discourse as mentioned above.
It must suffice here to note briefly some interesting beginnings of trans-cultural comparisons and reflections. The above reference to Confucius' conception of "appropriateness" was taken from a volume by Spariosu and Rüsen (2012) which contained a number of further contributions with the objective of working towards new Intercultural Perspectives on Humanism as their publication's subtitle suggests. We may mention also that with Sim (2007) we have "the first book-length scholarly comparison of the ethics of Aristotle and Confucius." (publisher's book cover) As Swanton's (2009, p.233 ) review states, "Sim's book is extremely instructive in bringing two virtue-oriented traditions together" ─ which, we may add, lead us to two different regions of Karl Jasper's Axial Age, namely ancient Greece and ancient China. A treatise with a similar intention of spanning this geographical divide but with a somewhat broader vision is Lloyd and Sivin's (2002) treatise on Science and medicine in early China and Greece. As the title suggests, it traces humanism in ancient China in the wake of Confucius' teachings and in the context of a comparison with ancient Greece.
We must also mention here that UNESCO's (1955, p. 8) The declaration expresses the "need to rethink the meaning of humanism in the face of divisive globalism, environmental crisis and the uncertain horizons of rapid scientific and technological development" as stated in its preamble.
It is in this spirit that in the following year the 2nd World Humanities Forum, also held at Busan, Korea, produced a massive and substantive document of more than 700 pages under the general theme of "Healing".
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There seem to be difficulties to sustain the high humanistic aspirations manifested by the two just mentioned Fora. We may gather this from the fact that the 3rd World Humanities Forum left its mark only in the form of a short entry on the internet pages of UNESCO. It seems that with UNESCO's well-wishing we are now in the era of "Let a thousand flowers bloom" in the field of trans-cultural discussions of humanities and humanism. One can only hope that this era will not end in a manner similar to the Hundred Flowers Campaign (1956/7) in the inner-Chinese context, namely with a radical reversal. The precedent for a reversal in humanist conceptions from trans-cultural acceptance to rejection is sketched by Evans' (2012) quoting T.G. Masaryk, after World War I the first president of the newly created Czechoslovakia. His humanism "followed logically: 'From humanity we proceeded to Slavdom and finally to Czechdom' ". It is still debatable, however, whether the subsequent way of manifesting Czechdom was a fitting tribute to humanism. 33 Cowan (2010) . It is well established by now that there is an astonishing but valid philological link between large parts of Europe and India on the basis of a common family resemblance of the Indo-European languages. From this trans-continental communality of language traits, some scholars constructed in the 19th century the existence of an "Aryan" people who spoke an arch-Indo European language and who were imagined as having been a noble race of ancestors common to "true" Indian and European descendants, as Arvidsson (2006) traces in some detail. 35 This absurd imagination of a noble ancestry common to the speakers of Indo-European languages had a bestialising consequence. The scholarly linguistic research project of the 18 th and 19 th centuries with the humanistic vision of a spiritual connection between large parts of Europe and India turned into an absurd race doctrine. Eventually this doctrine was adopted by the National Socialist Party ruling in Germany after 1933. This resulted in million-fold death for the allegedly non-Aryan minorities which the National Socialist doctrine elected to exterminate in the interest of re-establishing an erstwhile racial purity which, however, was just the product of absurd imagination.
The full circle of these trans-cultural appropriations is described in Cowan's (2010, p. 182 ) "Epilogue": million-strong ethnic German minority, should have been happy to be merely expelled from their homeland". The Economist then goes on to report and to discuss that after World War II "anywhere between 10,000 and 100,000 Sudeten Germans suffered a violent death in the process." 34 See the Jewish philosopher Yeshayahu Leibowitz in Ayoub (2014) : "An Austrian philosopher, who wasn't Jewish, Franz Grillparzer who, in my view, was one of the greatest thinkers of the 19th century,... warned against such a movement which leads people "Von der Humanität über die Nationalität zur Bestialität", in other words "from Humanity to nationality to bestiality. Madhav Golwalkar, the early RSS [extremist Hindu movement, GMA] leader... , believed that the "Aryans" were indigenous to India and ... sought to emulate Hitler's treatment of religious minorities to sustain the "purity" of the race and its culture. Nussbaum (2007, p. 162 ) makes a distinction between Golwalkar's aims and those in Nazi Germany in that for the extreme Hindu movement it is not race but dominance which is the issue. But she, too, considers the Hindu extremist attacks against Moslems as "quasi-fascist insurgency" (p. 183). The sad irony in all this is that an important root of the "quasi-fascist" mentality import into India is the imagination of a common transcontinental "Aryan" origin which once had a scholarly humanistic impetus in 18/19th century Europe.
We may conclude that for future humanistic programmes trans-cultural interchange cannot be an aim in itself. If, according to Grillparzer's just quoted quip, we must beware of the possibility that humanity slips into bestiality, then care must be taken that trans-cultural interchange does not result in eliminatory competition -in dreams or deeds of dominance. Cultivating humanism must incorporate mutual acceptance of otherness. It is in this regard that we may once more return to the millennia-long reverence for a Socratic mentality as the model for humanism.
Concluding remarks
In her plea for enhanced attention for the humanities Martha Nussbaum (2010, ch. IV) advocates a cultivation of "Socratic Pedagogy". We noted above that Steve Jobs, when writing about the classroom of the future, expressed his yearning for "an afternoon with Socrates". The specificity of Socrates as a model teacher is that he saw himself not as a transmitter of thought but as "midwife" for the thoughts of others as Plato let him explain in the dialogue Theaetetus.
36 Even when he did transmit knowledge, as to an uneducated slaveboy in the famous 'doubling of a square' in the dialogue Meno, Socrates would insist that the disciple "remembered" what was in his mind all along.
As he deeply respected the minds of others, Socrates equally respected his own inner voice. As an exemplary human being Socrates is remarkable in that in the Apology, facing an imminent death sentence, he convincingly claimed that he always was led by his own conscience and not by purposeful demands on him. It is this latter attitude which Steve Jobs (2005) put into his own words, emboldening the Stanford University graduates: Don't be... living with the results of other people's thinking. Don't let the noise of others' opinions drown out your own inner voice. And most important, have the courage to follow your heart and intuition. But talk about Socrates and about self-referring integrity seems to be terribly antiquated. Apple Computer's co-inventor Steve Jobs seems not to have realised that we live now in the midst of a "Fourth Revolution" where ICTs (Information and Communication Technologies) determine self understanding (Floridi 2014, ch. 4, pp. 87-100) .
Allegedly, it is nowadays "perfectly conceivable" that not thoughtful reflection but computer apps lead us to an appropriate understanding of the human self.
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For Floridi the use of ICTs defines modern societies as hyperhistorical. Hence (p. 81) The real educational challenge in hyperhistorical societies is increasingly what to put in the curriculum not how to teach it. In such a revolutionary world Jobs' "afternoon with Socrates" would hardly be of educational relevance since it would relate to the "how" of educational discourse and not to the "what" of its subject. Clearly, Socrates had not the faintest knowledge of the human self as an analogue to a computer app.
In seeming contradiction to our present argument for a reconsideration of an Axis Age-oriented humanism Floridi (2004, pp. viii-ix) claims that "attempts to make sense of our new hyperhistorical predicament" call for a revolutionary "new philosophy of information". But then Floridi (ibid.) proclaims: We need to look carefully at the roots of our culture and nurture them, precisely because we are rightly concerned with its leaves and flowers. If we take this statement seriously, then we cannot be content with the doctrine that nowadays we must think of the human self in analogy to a computer app. The roots of specifically human thinking go deeper than Floridi's computer analogies can reveal.
With some catchwords of the last quote in mind we conclude that even Floridi's vision of "hyperhistorical societies" requires some humanistic self-reflection. Even computer-inspired human apps need an assurance that they are indeed human. This we may gather from Floridi himself and from his appeal to "look carefully" at the roots of human cultures and to "nurture" these roots. This should be done with due respect for our own and others' past accumulations of humanistic insights. Thus it might well be that even a Floridi-type Fourth Revolution urgently calls for a Fourth Humanism.
